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and not to descend to the details of all questions which may arise
on each particular topic. It is for the magistrate, and the jurisconsult, penetrated with the general spirit of the laws, to discuss
their application:" Discours Prelimnaireto Code Napoleon.
53. It is a noteworthy fact that within a few years after the
promulgation of the Code Napoldon, there were numerous volumes
of French reports on different questions arising thereon,.as well
as volumes of statutory law made in France: Guthrie's Mod.
Law of Eng., p. 3, n.
54. Of this code it has been recently observed, that, as the
offspring of that imperial power which re-established confiscation,
and reopened Bastilles, it is, in many respects, unworthy of the
present state of French civilization: Eno. Brit., tit. "Punishment," p. 735.
55. Upon the whole, then, it is not a matter of surprise, that
the national courts of the United States-feeling compelled,
owing to their peculiar position, to ignore the common law in its
full force-on the one band see the vilest criminals escaping with
impunity; and, on the other band, from the extreme necessities
of the case, are compelled to adopt, perforce, without any direct
statutory authority whatever, the common-law doctrine of contempts, and, for their punishment, the common-law inflictions of
fine and imprisonment.
J. T.
(Tio be continued.)
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Agents, officers, or even a city council of a municipal corporation, cannot bind
the corporation by any act which transcends their lawful or legitimate powers.
And this rule applies to the issue of negotiable as well as non-negotiable evidences
of debt.
The duties and powers of the officers of a municipal corporation are prescribed
by the statute, and every person dealing with them as such may know, and is
charged with knowledge of the nature of these duties and the extent of these
powers.
A corporation may set up a plea of ultra vires, or its own want of power under
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charter or constituent statute to enter into a given contract, or to do a given
iet, in excess of its corporate power and authority.
Negotiability will not validate obligations which are not binding because of want
of power to make them.
Warrants drawn by the proper officers of a municipal corporation on the trea'urerthereof, are not bills of exchange, but are, in legal effect, the promissory'
notes of the corporation.
Municipal corporations have and can exercise only such powers as are expressly
-ranted, and such incidental ones as are necessary to make these powers available,
and are essential to effectuate the purposes of the corporation ; and these powers
are strictly construed.
When the officers of a city have no express power, to issue for current, ordinary
debts, negotiable paper which shall be free from equities in the hands of purchasers,
and it is not necessary as an incident to those granted, or to carry out the purposes
and objects of the corporation, it cannot be held to exist by implication.
The assignee of warrants drawn by the officers of a municipal corporation on the
treasury thereof, is bound, at his peril, to ascertain the nature and extent of the
powers of such officers and of such corporation.
The want of corporate power or the want of authority in the municipal officers,
cannot be supplied by their unauthorized action or representations.
Warrants issued by a municipal corporation in payment of a judgment at the
rate of one dollar in warrants for every seventy-five cents due on the judgment,
are tainted with usury.
It may be doubted whether a municipal corporation is bound by the action of its
council in agreeing to pay a sum clearly, distinctly, and ascertainably greater than
is legally due: arguendo, per DILLON, J.
No municipal corporation can erect a toll-bridge and levy and collect tolls,
unless authorized by the law of the state.
The city of Des Moines possessed no power, under the charter of 1857, to erect a
toll-bridge, either by itself or jointly with an individual.
A municipal corporation has no power to lend its credit or make its accommodation paper for the benefit of citizens, to enable them to execute private
enterprises.
The building of sidewalks is, ordinarily, a legitimate municipal object.
When a municipal corporation, acting under the Constitution of 1846, issued in
payment of a bond fide indebtedness, scrip to circulate as money, after which the
scrip was taken up by the issuance of ordinary warrants on the treasury thereof for
the amount of the same, it was held that the transaction could not be impeached
by the corporation on the ground that the scrip was illegal and void.

APPEAL

from Polk District Court.

This was an action against the city of Des Moines, based upon
two hundred and twenty-two different city warrants or orders.
The plaintiff sued as assignee or holder. He was not the payee
of any of them. A copy of one of the class of orders payable
out of the "general fund," is as follows:-
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"No.

783.

CITY WARRANT.

$8.00

DES MOINES, IoWA, October 21st 1862.
To the Treasurer of the City of Des Moines:
Pay U. H. White or bearer, eight dollars, out of any moneys
in the general fund, not otherwise appropriated.
THos. CAVANAUGH, Mayor.
Attest. H. W. KING, Recorder."
Indorsed: "Presented November 24th 1862. J. E. HULL,
City Treasurer."
Another set of warrants were in the same form as the one
above set out, and payable to M. P. Turner, or bearer, "1out
of any moneys in the West Side Road Fund, not otherwise
appropriated."
Other warrants were in the same form, issued to different
persons, payable "out of any moneys in the East Side Road
Fund, not otherwise appropriated."
Other warrants were in the same form as the one above copied,
payable out of the general fund, with this written indorsement
across the printed blank on which they were issued, viz.:
" Issued for scrip surrendered, and bearing six per cent. interest,
from January 17th 1860. H. W. KING, Recorder. Presented
January 14th 1863. J. E. HULL, City Treasurer."
Various defences were made, which, with the other questions
arising upon this appeal, will be noticed in the opinion. Judgment in the District Court, passed for the plaintiff, partly upon
demurrer and partly upon the verdict of a jury.
The defendant is the appellant.
Polk

fubbell,
H
for appellant.

P illips & Phillips,for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
DILLON, J.-I. The plaintiff is the assignee of the orders or
warrants in the suit. It is not alleged in the answer, nor was it
shown on the trial, that he was not a bond fide holder of these
instruments for value, and without notice of matters now pleaded,
as defences thereto. It is claimed by the plaintiff that the warrants being signed by the proper officers of the city, authenticated
by its corporate seal, and negotiable in form, he, as the innocent
holder thereof, stands, like a similar holder of ordinary mercantile
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paper, free from and "unaffected by the equities and defences
which the city set up in bar of his recovery.
This view of the law was the one adopted by the court below,
in its rulings priqr to and upon the trial. Thus, after stating the
law applicable to the warrants issued for "1scrip surrendered,"-'
as to which more will presently be said-the court charged the
jury as follows: "As to all the other warrants, they are negotiable, and there is no evidence tending to show that they were
issued without authority or without consideration ; all evidence
of this kind having been excluded, because it was not shown or
offered to be shown that the plaintiff had knowledge of such
defences ; and if you believe, from the evidence, that the warrants
were issued by the defendant and that plaintiff is the owner
thereof, you will find for him as to all such warrants." So the
bill of exceptions recites, that " the defendant, on the trial,
offered to show by the record of the proceedings of the city
council, that all of said warrants were issued without any autharity from the said city council, and without any vote of said
council authorizing the same," but this evidence the court refused
to receive, because the warrants were negotiable and there was
no offer to show that the plaintiff took them with notice of such
defect or irregularity.
This view of the law is, we think, erroneous. If my name be
signed to a promissory note by a person representing himself to
-be my agent, but "without any authority" from me, I am not
bound; and I am no more bound because the obligation has been
put in a negotiable form than if it has been put in a form not
negotiable.
And the same rule must and does apply to paper purporting to
be issued by the agents or officers of public or municipal corporations. The general principle of law is well known and definitely
settled, that the agents, officers, or even city council of a municipal corpoiation, cannot bind the corporation when they transcend
their lawful and legitimate powers.
This doctrine rests upon this reasonable ground. The body corporate is constituted of all of the inhabitants within the corporate
limits. The inhabitants are the corporators. The officers of the
corporation, including the legislative or governing body, are
merely the public agents of the corporators. Their duties and
their powers are prescribed by statute. Every one, therefore,
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may know the 'nature of these duties and the extent of these
powers. These considerations, as well as the dangerous nature
of the opposite doctrine, demonstrate the reasonableness and
necessity of the rule; that the corporation is bound only when
its agents (by whom, from the very necessities of its being, it
must act, if it acts at all) keep within the limits of their authority. Not only so, but such a corporation may successfully
interpose the plea of ultra vires, that is, set up as a defence its
own want of power under its charter or constituent statute to
enter into a given contract or to do a given act in violation or
excess of its corporate power and authority. The cases asserting
these principles are numerous and uniform; some of the more
important and striking ones only need be cited: Mayor of
Albany v. Ounliff (city not liable for negligently building bridge
under an unconstitutionalstatute), 2 Comst. (N. Y.) 165 (1849) ;
reversing s. c., 2 Barb. 190; Cuyler v. Trustees of .Rochester
(laying out street contrary to charter), 12 Wend. 165 (1834) ;
Hodges v. Buffalo (4th July appropriation), 2 Denio 110 (1846);
Halstead v. The Mayor, 3 Comst. 430 (1850); Martin v. The
Mayor, 1 Hill 545; Boone v. Utica, 2 Barb. 104; Cornell v.
Guilford, 1 Denio 510; Boyland v. The Hayor and Aldermen
of 1New York, 1 Sandf. (N. Y.) 27 (1847); -Dillv. Wareham, 7
Mete. 438 (1844); Vincent v. Nantucket, 12 Cush. 103, 105
(1858), per MERRICK, J.; Stetson v. Kemyton, 18 Mass. 272;
Parsons v. Inhabitants of Goshen, 11 Pick. 39G; Wood v.
Inhabitants of Lynn, I Allen (Mass.) 108 (1861); Syalding
v. Lowell, 23 Pick. 71; Mitchell v. .Rociland, 45 Me. 496
(1858) ; s. c., 41 Id. 363 ; Anthony v. Adams, 1 Mete. (Mass.)
284 (1840); Western College v. Cleveland, 12 Ohio 375 (1861);
-Commissioners v. Cox, 6 Ind. 403 (1855); The Inhabitants v.
Weir, 9 Id. 224 (1857); Smead v. The Indianapolis,Pittsburgh,
and Cleveland Railroad Co., 11 Id. 104 (1858); Brady v. The
Mayor, 20 N. Y. (6 Smith) 312; Appleby v. The Mayor, &c.,
15 How. Pr. 428; Estep v. Heokuk County, 18 Iowa 199, and
cases cited by CoLE, J. ; Clark v. Polk County, 19 Iowa 248.
Negotiability will not validate obligations which are not binding, because of a want of power to issue them: Gould v. Sterling
(action on loan bonds), 23 N. Y. 464, s. c., 1 Am. Law Reg.
N. S. 290, and note of Prof. Dwight thereon, a portion of whose
remarks are so strikingly in point that we quote them: "It
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seems entirely clear," he observes (Id., p. 297), "1that no representation by an agent can even establish the fact of agency.
If a person, who is not in fact authorized, represents that he has
power to execute a promissory note for another, the instrument.
so far as the supposed principal is concerned, is utterly void.
The negotiability of the note will have no effect upon the question,
as the inquiry turns upon the existence of the note itself. The
term " negotiability" presupposes the existence of an instrument
made by a person having capacity or power to contract in that
particular manner." (s. 1., Hull & Argalls v. Marshall Co.,
12 Iowa 142, 162, per Lows, J.) In Starin v. aenoa, and
Could v. Sterling, 23 N. Y. 452, 464, the plaintiffs were bond
fide holders, for value, of negotiable bonds, and the Court of
Appeals of New York held that they were bound to inquire into
the power to issue them. " One who takes a negotiable note or
bill of exchange purporting to be made by an agent," says Mr.
Justice SELDEN (Id. 464), "is bound to inquire as to the power
of the agent." Analyzing, in the case at bar, the view of the
court below, it will be found to involve three several distinct
propositions: 1st. That the warrants in suit are negotiable paper.
2d. That the officers of the city (mayor and recorder), or at all
events the city council, has power to create and issue negotiable
paper, and,
3d. That warrants, like the ones in question, are valid in the
hands of an innocent holder, even if issued without authority
or without consideration. With reference to this, as well as
other portions of the record, it is necessary to examine these
propositions :
(a.) The orders in suit are not bills of exchange, as a bill of
exchange proper involves the idea of at least two distinct parties,
drawer and drawee. The instruments in suit are orders by the
city on itsef-mere directions to its treasurer to pay the amount
to the bearer. In legal effect they are the promissory notes of
the city: Miller v. Thomson, 3 Man. & Gr. 576; followed,
Fairchildv. The Ogdensburgh, Olayton, and .ome Railroad Co.,
15 N. Y. 337 ; Bull v. Sims, 2"3 Id. 570, 572 ; Clark v. Polk
County, 19 Iowa 248. And by usage and statute (Rev., ch. 73)
they pass by delivery, and the holder, as "the real party in
interest," may bring suit upon them in his own name: Steel v.
Davis County, 2 G. Greene 469; Brown v. Johnson County, 1
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Id. 486; Cdmpbell v. Polk County, 8 Iowa 467. The debtor
corporation may give a written acknowledgment of the debt. It
may miake this run to order or bearer without invalidating it;
but it does not follow, as we shall show, that there is an implied
power to invest these with all the qualities of commercial paper.
(b.) There is further involved, in the view of the District Court,
the proposition that it is competent for the city officers (mayor
and recorder) to issue its obligations in a negotiable form, and
endow them with all of the attributes of negotiable, mercantile
securities. Upon examining the charter under which these warrants were issued (Laws 1857, oh. 185, p. 281), no express
power to issue promissory notes or other negotiable paper is conferred. If the power exists to make paper, which, in the hands
of a bond fide holder, cuts off equities, it must be an implied
power.
It is a familiar and elementary principle that municipal corporations have and can exercise such powers, and such only, as are
expressly granted, and such incidental ones as are necessary to
make those powers available, and essential to effectuate the purposes of the corporation; and th'ese powers are strictly construed:
2 Kent Com. 298; Mayor v. Cunliff, supra, and the authorities
cited in connection therewith.
It is held that banking and trading corporations have the
implied or incidental power to make negotiable paper: McCullough v. Moss, 5 Denio 567; Straus v. Eagle Insurance Co., 5
Ohio 59 (1855) ; Mott v. Hicks, 1 Cow. 518 ; Attorney-General
v. Life and Fire Insurance Co., 9 Paige 470; 2 Kent Com.
299; 1 Pars. N. and B. 165. And the same rule has in some'
'Cases been applied, by way of analogy, to municipal and public
corporations; but not so as to cut off inquiry into the validity of
the paper or just defences: XWelley v. The Mayor, &c., 4 Hill
263. See Ohemunq Canal Bank v. Supervisors, ft., 5 Denio,
517; Came v. Brigham, 39 Me. 39; Clarke v. School .District,
3 R. I. 199. To this doctrine, as applied to commercial corporations, we see no objection; but we do see many and serious
objections to treating the ordinary warrants of counties and
cities, as possessing all of the incidents and qualities of commercial paper.
These warrants are unlike bonds issued on time, negotiable in
form, and for sale in the market, as, for example, those issued by
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towns, cities, and counties to railroad companies, under express
act of the legislature (for they cannot be issued without express
legislative authorization), in payment for stock subscribed. Such
sccurit*-cs are made and issued for the express purpose of raising.
money by their sale ; and the attainment of this object would be
embarrassed or defeated if they were subject to equities in the
hands of bond fide purchasers. They are, therefore, held to be
negotiable, with all the incidents of negotiability: Cla2p v.
Cedar County, 5 Iowa 15 ; Morris Canal Co. v. Fisher, 1
Stock. Oh. 66T (1855), s. c., 3 Am. Law Reg. G. S. 423;
Gelpeke v. .Dubuque, 1 Wal. (U. S.) 175 ; Craig v. -fieksburg,
31 Miss. 216 ; Jackson.v. Railroad Co., 2 Am. Law Reg. N. S.
585, s. c., Id. 748, and note of Judge REDFIELD O
Chapin v.
Vermont and illassacliusettsRailroad Co., 8 Gray 575; Clark
v. Janesville, 10 Wis. 136; Maddox v. GraLam, 2 Mete. (Ky.)
56 ; Go ud v. Sterling, supra; White v. Railroad Co., 21 How.
575; Id. 539; Bank v. The New York and New Haven Railroad Co., 3 Kern. 599, s. c., 4 Duer 480.
But with warrants like those in suit, it is entirely different.
Under the charter of the city (§ 18), it is made "the duty of the
city council to liquidate and settle all claims and demands against
the city." And by the same section it is provided that no money
shall be drawn from the city treasury "1except by order under
the authority of the city council."
The city council audit and allow claims and demands, and their
action in this regard is to be entered of record (Chrter, § 3).
Upon a certified copy of these proceedings, the taeasurer of the
city would be authorized to pay the claimant.
But by usage, or perhaps under a by-law, orders like those
before us are drawn upon the treasurer. This mode is adopted
for convenience, and these instruments are not to be assimilated,
in all respects, to ordinary commercial paper.
On this question the argument may be thus condensed: There
is no express authority to the officers of this city to issue negotiable paper which shall be free from equities in the hands of
purchasers. And the existence of such a power is not necessary
as an incident to those granted, or to carry out the purposes and
objects of the corporation, and would be attended with abuse and
fraught with danger. It should not, therefore, be held to exist
as an i.,plied power: Smith v. Cheshire, 13 Gray (Mass.) 318
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(1859) ; .In
,c.
eab.,
v. Weir, 9 Ind. 224 (1857); H7alstead v.
UTe l1ayor, &c., and other cases cited, supra. Whether the
corporation defendant could speeially confer power upon its
officers to bind it by the issue of negotiable paper, which should
be free from equities, is a question which the record does not
require to be decided.
(c.) It is further involved in the view of the District Court,
that an innocent holder of one of these warrants may recover
thereon, though it be issued without consideration or without
authority. The unsoundness of this view we have already pointed
out. The warrants purport to be issued by the agents of the city.
The plaintiff, in taking these warrants, was bound, at his peril,
to ascertain the nature and extent of the power of these officers
and of the city corporation; Delafield v. State of Illinois, 2
Hill 159, 174; 2G Wend. 192, s. c., 8 Paige 53; Hodges v.
Buffalo, 2 Denio 110; Supervisors v. Bates, 17 N. Y. 242;
Overseers v. Overseers of -Pharsalia,15 Id. 341; Butterfieifd v.
Inhabitants of Melrose, 6 Allen 187; Bossire v. City of Boton,
4 Id. 57; Zabriskie v. Cleveland, Columbus, and Cinei, nati
Railroad Co., 23 How. 381, 398.
By examination, he may find that these warrants cannot 'awfully be issued without the order of the city council. This i iust
be entered of record " on the journals of the city, which shall be
open" (so the charter declares) 1 to the inspection and examination of every citizen." A warrant issued by the mayor and
recorder without the previous order of the council, is void.
They have no authority to do it, and it would be substantially a
forgery. A purchaser of such a warrant is bound at his peril, at
least, to ascertain that the claim upon which it is founded has
been liquidated and settled by the council. A representation by
municipal officers that this has been done (and the issue of such a
warrant is in substance such a representation), will not be binding
upon the corporation. Why ? The answer is, because an agent
can neither create nor enlarge his powers by his unauthorized
representations. The law on this subject has of late years been
much investigated, and will be found discussed and examined in
a most critical, able, and exhaustive manner, in the following
important cases: Mechanics' Bank v. New York and New
Haven Railroad Co. (Schuyler Frauds), 13 N. Y. 599 (1856).
Farmers' Bank v. Butchers' and Drovers' Bank (where tellei
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without real but with apparent power, certified negotiable check
as good), 14 N. Y. 623, s. c., 16 Id. 125; Claflin v. The Farmers' and Citizens' Bank, so., 25 Id. 293, s. c., 2 Am. Law Reg.
N. S. 92, and note; Gould v. Sterling, supra; the two last dis-.
tinguished from the case in 14 N. Y. 623; Griswold v. Havens,
25 N. Y. 595 (1862); 26 Id. 505. Now without entering into
these interesting discussions respecting the liabilities of principals
in certain cases, for the acts of agents aTparently, but not really,
within the scope of their commission, we need only observe that
if it be conceded that the mayor and recorder had the apparent
power to issue warrants like the ones in suit, still if they did not
really have this authority, their representations that they possessed it would not be the representations of a fact which from
its nature (as in the case of the teller, who certified the checks),
rested peculiarly within the knowledge of the agent. On the
contrary, the charter and the journals of the corporation, open to
public inspection, afford to every person the certain means of
ascertaining the existence of the authority of these officers to
issue the warrants.
We have been able, after a very thorough investigation, to find
no case which holds that city and county warrants, like those
before us, are freed from equities when in the hands of bond fide
holders. Nor has the plaintiff's counsel called our attention to
.any such. On the other hand, we have found several cases in
different states expressly holding that such orders were not commercial paper in the hands of an innocent holder, so as to exclude
evidence of the legality of their issue or preclude defences
thereto. See Yalstead v. The kayor, &c., of New York (on
audited city warrants like those in suit), 5 Barb. 218 (1849),
s. c., affirmed in Court of Appeals, but where the rights of a
bond fid6 holder were not passed on, 3 Comst. 430 (1850);
People v. El Dorado County (on audited county warrants distinctly holding that bond fide assignee stood in shoes of payee),
11 Cal. 170 (1858); S. P., Sturtevant v. Liberty (town orders),
46 Me. 457; Smith v. Inhabiiants of Cheshire, 13 Gray (Mass.)
318 (1859); Andover v. Grafton (on note made by town), 7
N. H. 298 (1834); Sanborn v. Deerfield, 2 Id. 251, 254; Dalrymple v. Whittingham, 26 Vt. (4 Deane) 345; Inhabitantsv.
Weir, 9 Ind. 224 (1857); School -District v. Thompson, 5
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Minn. 280 (1861), approving 5 Barb. 218 ; Clark v. Polk County,
19 Iowa 248, and cases cited by CoLE, J.
It must not be supposed, that certain cases recently decided
by the Supreme Court of the United States have escaped attention. These cases were brought upon negotiable county and city
bonds, and where there was express power to issue them: Commissioners of Knox County v. Aspinwall, 21 How. 539, 544;
approved and followed in Bissell v. Jeffersonville, 24 Id. 287
(1860), and aeleke v. Dubuque, 1 Wallace 203.
In the latter case, speaking of the express power of the city
of -Dubuqueto issue the bonds sued on, Judge SwAYND, following
Knox County v. Aspinwall, laid down this rule: "When a corporation has power, under any circumstances, to issue negotiable
securities, the bond fide holder has a right to presume that they
were issued under the circumstances which give the requisite
authority, and they are no more liable to be impeached, for any
infirmity, in the hands of such a holder than any commercial
paper.'"
Upon this, without calling in question its correctness in the
particular case in which it was used, we remark: 1. That this
language was employed in a case where there was express,
specific power, on the part of the city, to issue negotiable bonds,
and in that respect is distinguishable from the case before us.
2. Experienced jurists, conscious of difficulty and danger attending it, hesitate to lay down general and unqualified rules, professing to embrace all cases. With due deference, the language
above quoted is susceptible of being taken to assert a doctrine,
which, without reasonable limitations, cannot be true as respects
public and municipal corporations.
Suppose a city charter
,expressly authorized the common council to issue negotiable
securities for corporate debts, and that the mayor and tecorder,
without an order of the council, fabricate,-manufacture -such
securities, and that they find their way into the hands of innocent
purchasers. It cannot be that Judge SwAvNE means that " the
bond fide holder has a right to presume that they were issued
under the circumstances which gave the requisite authority."
The true rule is, that the want of corporate power, or the want
of authority in the municipal officers, cannot be supplied by their
unauthorized acts or representations: Gould v. Town of Sterling, supra; Treadwell v. Commissioners, 11 Ohio 183, corn-

CLARK v. CITY OF DES MOfIES.

mentlig on and criticising Knox County v. Aspinwall, 21 How.
539.
Any other doctrine nullifies the limitations and checks contained in the charter for the protection of the corporators, and
needlessly invests the public officers and agents with the power
successfully to " Schuylerize" our public corporations, without
limit and without remedy. Whether warrants, like those in suit,
issued by order of the council, but which order was based upon
the allowance of a claim for which the city was not legally liable,
would, in the hands of a bond fide holder, be free from equities,
is a question of great difficulty, and which we pass, because not
necessary to be now decided. It will be found discussed and
decided in some of the authorities before referred to..
II. For answer to the third count in the petition, the city says
"that the warrant therein set out was executed to Keyes and
Crawford, the payees thereof, in satisfaction of a judgment held
and owned by them against the city at the rate of one dollar in
warrants for each seventy-five cents due on said judgment; that
the city council thereby exceeded their authority, and the said
warrant thus issued is illegal, usurious, and void."
To this defence the court sustained the plaintiff's demurrer,
and the defendant excepted and abided by his answer. The
legal sufficiency of this defence is one of the questions presented
in this appeal. For forbearance or " giving day of payment," a
creditor under our Statute of Usury cannot lawfully receive or
contract to receive more than ten per cent. interest.
If I purposely give my note for $100, payable on demand, in
satisfaction of a debt or judgment for only $75, it is primd facie,
and perhaps conclusively, usurious. And so it is if the same be
done by a corporation. Besides, it may well be doubted, whether
the corporation is bound by the action of its council, in agreeing
to pay a sum clearly, distinctly, and ascertainably greater than
is legally due. Courts hold a stiff rein on corporate allowances ;
and auditing officers or bodies cannot, in general, allow and pay
claims, however meritorious, if they are not legally chargeable:
People v. Stout, 23 Barb. 349; People v. Lawrence, 6 Hill 244
(1843); Id. 463; Chemung Canal Bank v. Siupervisors, 5 Denio
517, 521 (1848); Hfalstead v. The Mayor, &e., 5 Barb. 218,
s. c., 3 Comst. 430; Lake v. Trustees of Williamsburg, 4 Denio
520; Supervisors v. Briggs, 2 Id. 26, s. o., 2 Hill 135 ;
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Augusta v. Leadbetter, 16 Me. 45; compare Bean v. .Tay, 23
Id. 117, 121; and see also Gamzpbell v. Polk County,, 3 Iowa
467.
The defence pleaded was good pro tanto, and the demurrer
should have been overruled instead of sustained.
III. It is also set up in bar of recovery on certain warrants
payable to Turner, that they " were issued and loaned to aid him
in constructing a toll-bridge across the Raccoon river in the corporate limits of the city." This is the substance of the answer
in this respect. No person or corporation can erect a toll-bridge
and levy and collect tolls, any more than a person or corporation
can set up a ferry and levy and collect ferriage, unless this be
authorized by the law of the state. In -De Jure 2aris (ch. II. ;
Id., ch. III.), Sir Matthew Hale says: "No -man can take a
settled or constant toll even in his own private land for a common
passage without the king's license :" 4 Am. Law Reg. N. S.513,
and authorities there cited; Prosserv. WFapello Countyq, 18 Iowa
327 ; 31ullarky v. Cedar Falls, 19 Id. 21.
How Turner obtained authority to erect a toll-bridge within
the corporate limits of the city, does not appear. The authority
may, as in the Cedar Falls case just cited, antedate the corporate
organization of the city. Whether under the statute it can be
conferred by the county authorities within the limits, and upon
the streets of the city, we need not stop to inquire. We will
assume, on the averments, that Turner had the lawful power to
erect the bridge. The city of Des Moines, under its charter,
possessed no power to erect such a bridge for itself and by itself:
Mullarky v. Cedar Falls, supra. Nor would it have the power
to erect such a bridge jointly with an individual, or to appropriate
funds of the city in aid of such a private enterprise.
The power of the city (Charter, § 14)." to improve sidewalks,
alleys, and streets," " to make by-laws necessary and proper for
the good regulation, safety, and health of the city,.' would not
authorize it to erect or aid in the erection of a toll-bridge by a
loan of the corporate credit. It might be different as respects
free, public bridges.
Turner's bridge was, if would appear, essentially an individual
enterprise. Let it be granted that, if erected, the bridge would
be of advantage to the city by facilitating the intercourse of
citizens residing on different sides of the river. So the erection
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of an eeviter or of a private market-house might be beneficial to
the city. But would this justify the city in issuing its warrants,
and loanny them to a private individual, to aid him in erecting
the elevator or private market-house ? No instance occurs to us,
in which it would be competent for the city to loan its credit, or.
make its accommodation paper for the benefit of citizens, to enable
them to execute private enterprises: 1 Parsons N. and B. 166;
Smead v. Indianapolis, Pittsburgh, and -teveland Bailroad
Co., 11 Ind. 105.
To recognise such a right would be to break down, to a great
extent, the charter checks and limitations on the power of the
corporation-checks and limitations designed to protect and
secure the inhabitants against the dangers of speculative and
extra-municipal projects. Though the averments are not very
full and specific, the answer sets up that the warrants were loaned
to Turner to aid him in building a toll-bridge for himself, and
this, privid facie at least, is in excess of the corporate authority
of the city. If the bridge was already erected on one of the
streets of the city, if Turner, by law, had the right to exact tolls
from the citizens, we will not say that the corporation would not
be authorized to make, among other agreements that might be
imagined, an arrangement whereby its citizens might pass free
from tolls, and issue its warrants in payment for the privileges
thus acquired. No such case is presented. We decide only
.that it cannot loan its credit or paper to aid an individual in constructing a toll-bridge, or to aid any other scheme essentially
private. To prevent municipal corporations from engaging in
banking and speculative enterprises, it is necessary, as this case
shows, and as the current history of these bodies has demonstrated,
to keep the corporate wings clipped down to the legal standard.
The court erred in sustaining the demurrer to this part of the
answer.
As to the warrants issued to Johnson, different considerations
apply. Building sidewalks is, under the charter, a legitimate
municipal object. Why the street committee had no authority
in law to make such a contrac, is not alleged. The ruling of the
District Court on this point is affirmed.
IV. Certain of the warrants in suit purport on their face to
have been issued " for city scrip surrendered." The city pleaded,
that the scrip thus surrendered, and which constituted the con-
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sideration of these warrants, was issued in violation of Art. 5 of
the old Constitution and chap. 147 of the Code of 1851-being
intended to circulate as money.
To this the plaintiff responds, in substance: that the scrip
itself was issued by the city, and used by it to redeem city warrants founded upon a valuable consideration. It appeared on the
trial, that in 1857 the city council passed an ordinance reciting:
" the present scarcity of money," " the impossibility of collecting
taxes," "1the impolicy of paying interest on loans," and the
policy of issuing " for general circulation, convenient warrants"
that tax-payers might become enabled to pay their taxes, and
providing for the issue of engraved city warrants in denominations of $1, $2, $3, and $5. In phraseology the warrants thus
issued are like' those now in suit. In appearance they are like
bank-bills, being on bank-note paper, with vignette, &c.
This scrip the treasurer was authorized to receive for taxes
and to exchange for outstanding city warrants drawn in the usual
form. The evidence does not show that any scrip was issued by
the city, except to pay city indebtedness, or in exchange for outstanding evidences of city debts. The " scrip" was for a time
popular, and, as invited by the city, its creditors received it in
payment or in exchange for other evidences of municipal liability.
Time wore on; the scrip would seem to have declined in popular
favor, and not to have realized the high anticipations which its
emission had inspired. Empirical, if not illegal, the remedy did
not cure or relieve the corporate ills recited in the ordinance to
exist. So in 1860, the council "changed its base." In 1857 it
asked warrant-holders to exchange them for scrip. They did so.
In 1860 it authorized "the issue of city orders for the redemption of city scrip." Scrip-holders conforming to the wishes of
the city, then. surrendered scrip and received warrants, such as
those in suit, and such as those which they had given up to the
city when they received the scrip.
On this part of the case the court charged that the scrip was
illegal, because issued in violation of the constitution, and so far
the defendant does not complain; but it further directed the jury,
in substance, that if the city owed a valid and admitted debt, paid
it in scrip, and then took up the scrip by issuing the warrants in
question, the law regards this as a settlement of the transaction,
and the warrants would be supported by a sufficient consideration,
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and be valid and binding. The jury so found the fact to be, and
the evidence fully sustains the finding. Under the circumstances,
this defence is entitled to no favor. Unless corporations are
exempt from the ordinary principles of fair dealing that apply.
between man and man, this defence has no just foundation. It
is the duty of courts not to allow the honest and just merits of a
cause to be entangled in the meshes of sophistical reasoning, and
rules purely technical. Not a member of the city council would,
we are persuaded, make uch a defence for himself. We have
multiplied and constantly recurring examples of the fact, that
under the shield of their corporate character men daily do acts
which they would never do as individuals. Nor are these
examples confined to this side of the Atlantic. "It is a familiar
fact," says Mr. Herbert Spencer, that the corporate conscience
is ever inferior to the individual conscience; that a body of men
will commit, as a joint act, that which every individual of them
would shrink from did he feel personally responsible :" Essays,
No. VHII., p. 261, Am. ed., 1865; and see Id., Essay V., for
description, perhaps too highly colored, of the workings of
English reformed municipal corporations.
That the charge of the District Court was correct, even conceding the scrip to be illegal, we have no doubt. See Aullarky
v. Uedar Balls, 19 Iowa 21 ; Alleghany Jty v. Me Ulinkan, 14
.Pa. 81 (1850) ; .Ear y v. Mahan, 19 Johns. 147.
For the reasons above given, however, the judgment must be
reversed.
We have delayed the publication of
the foregoing opinion, with the hope of
being able to prepare a note to accompany the same, but upon reflection we
have become convinced that the opinion
contains most of the cases bearing upon
the questions discussed, and we have not
been able to perceive any good ground
to qualify the propositions contained in
the syllabus of the case.
The subject of the extent of municipal
authority has been largely discussed in
some of the states in connection with
appropriations made in furtherance of
the war to put down the rebellion. But
the general principle here declared has
been adhered to, with great strictness,
VOn. XV.-I 1

notwithstanding the pressure,'in particular cases, for an extension of municipal
authority by way of construction. There
can be no question, we apprehend, that
municipal, like other corporations, exist
and act solely by force of the powers
conferred upon them, either by special
charter or general legislation.
It is
therefore a mere truism to declare, that
the agents of a municipal corporation
cannot bind the municipality beyond the
limits of its powers, and that those who
contract with the agents of such corporations must, at their peril, take notice of
the limits of those powers and, by consequence, of those of their agents. It is
very obvious, too, that any corporation
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may take advantage of its own defect
of authority, for if that were not so it
would become impossible, in practice.
to restrain the acts of any corporation
within the limits of its powers.
The proposition, too, here declared,
that a contract, professedly made by a
corporation, beyond the limits of its
powers, derives no additional force from
its being in negotiable form, is one of
considerable pradtical importance, and
one which might not readily strike the
mind of all with favor. The fact that
negotiable paper, made in violation of
statutory enactments, and which on that
account would be void between the original parties, has been held valid in
favor of bond fide holders for value,
has led many to suppose that negotiable
paper made by corporations, ultra vires,
would nevertheless bind the company
in favor of such bond fide holders for
value. But it was held in the case
of Balfour v. Ernest, 5 Jur. N- S. 439,
s. o., 5 C. B. N. S. 601, that a bill
of exchange drawn on behalf of a joint
stock company, in the form prescribed
by statute, does not bind the company,
even in the hands of a bond fide holder,
if the bill be drawn for any purpose, not
within the scope of the business of the
company, or the powers of the directors.
And the proposition is very obviously

LTH v. REED.
just, upon general principles, that a
corporation cannot enlarge their powers
to contract by assuming to do so in a
particular form.
What is here decided, in regard to the
want of power in a municipal corporation
to erect a bridge and levy and coll'ct
tolls for passing the same, is clearly the
result of the well-settled doctrine, that
such corporations have no power to make
a railway grant for the transportation
of passengers and collecting of fares.
The discussion of these several topics
by the learned judge, and the careful
collection of the cases bearing upon the
questions discussed, will render the opinion exceedingly valuable to the profession. And we have often regretted that
our courts of last resort had not more
leisure to prepare their opinions in a
similarly satisfactory manner. But it is
the curse of our day and generation, that
our ablest and most useful men ruin
themselves and fail to serve the public
with any acceptance, just because they
are pushed beyond their strength and
ability; and by attempting to do ten
times as much as- they can do well,.
really fail of doing anything to any
purpose. We feel that much of this
complaint may well be laid at our own
doors, notwithstanding the utmost effort
I. F. R.
to resist the tendency.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
COMMONWEALTH v. REED.
The commonwealth may maintain a civil action for its own use for damages
against a sheriff for breach of his official bond by negligence in arresting a party
charged with crime, or by wilfully taking insufficient surety from such party for
his appearance.

THIS was an action against a sheriff and his sureties for an
alleged breach of his official bond, in negligently failing to arrest
Stephen Patterson, on four bench warrants issued on four several
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indictments for unlawful gaming, and also in wilfully taking
insufficient security for Pinkney Patterson, whom he had arrested
under indictments for permitting unlawful gaming in his housethe petition alleging the escape of Stephen and the insolvency.
of Pinkney Patterson.
PER CuRIA.-The Circuit Court having sustained a demurrer
to the petition-which is good if such an action be maintainablethe only question for revision by this court is, whether the commonwealth has a right, for its own use, to recover in a civil suit,
against the sheriff and his sureties, damages for a breach of their
covenant.
Although there may be no precedent of any judicial recognition of such a remedy, yet we can perceive no reason why it
should not be available, and it seems to us that principle sanctions it, and that it is sustained by both the common and statutory law of Kentucky.
-The sheriff's official bond is required for assuring his fidelity
as well to the commonwealth as to every individual who may lose
by his infidelity. His delinquencies, as charged in this case,
might subject the commonwealth to some insecurity, and to loss
of revenue which she might have derived from the execution of
the process. Why, then, should not she, as well as a citizen,
have a right of action for damages to himself from a breach of
the bond given to her for securing her interests as well as those
of citizens ?
The fact that the sheriff may be liable to a fine is no sufficient
answer. This is only punitive ; the civil action is remunerative.
He may be insolvent, and his sureties would not be responsible
for the fine. And the actual damage to the commonwealth may
greatly exceed the amount of the fine.
No& is the indeterminateness of the damages and the difficulty
of ascertaining their precise amount by any certain or fixed
standard, a sufficient answer.
The same difficulty occurs' in many other classes of actions
undoubtedly maintainable. Nominal damages might always be
recovered, and generally the amount of the prescribed fine would
afford a definite criterion for assessing the civil damages. In
this case no court can assume that had Stephen Patterson been
arrested he would ever have been tried, or, if tried, convicted,
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or, if convicted, that the fines would ever have been collected by
the commonwealth. But still, for every wrong there is a remedy;
therefore, the imputed breach of the bond must be actionable
upon common-law principles, and the damages must be assessed
by the best tests the facts of the case may afford.
Confirmatory and, as we think, only declaratory of the common
law-the sixth section of article 8, chapter 83, of Stantons Rev.
Stat., p. 259, provides that "clerks of courts, sheriffs, and other
public officers, and their sureties, and the heirs, distributees,
devisees, and personal representatives of each, may be proceeded
against by suit or motion, jointly or severally, for their liabilities
or defalcations by the commonwealth in her own right."
The application of this enactment cannot be restricted by the
context of the article in which it is found, and Which is too contracted for its useful or consistent operation. But it is, in its
range, coextensive with the chapter on revenue, and applies to
every case affecting the revenue of the commonwealth, as this
case certainly may affect it by possible diminution. One of the
principal objects seems to have been to hold the sureties to
liability. On these grounds we are of the opinion that the
action, as brought, is maintainable, and that, consequently, the
Circuit Court erred in sustaining the demurrer to the petition.
Wherefore, the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The importance and novelty of the
foregoing decision seem to bring it fully
within the range of our publication.
We cannot say, that we should have
been inclined, & priori, to have adopted
the same view of the law, and still we
are far from feeling any decided repugnance to the decision. It seems to us,
that the statute of the state referred to in
the opinion may be regarded as favoring
the view taken by the court. It is true
the court also intimates that the view is
sustained, by principle, as well as by the
common and statutory law of Kentucky.
We feel very confident that the common law of England countenances no
such remedy in favor of the government,
in cases of a criminal or penal nature,
where the default complained of is in

not detaining the accused party, when
arrested, and where the proceeding is,
in form, criminal. The only remedy
which could there be resorted to in cases
of that character would be by attachment
for a contempt of the court before whom
the process is made returnable. The
English authorities are digested in 14
Petersdorff's Ab. 615. It seems that at
common law the remedy by attachment
was the only one allowed. Remedies
by action in favor of private parties seem
to be exclusively of statutory origin in
England. But some of the later English
statutes have given an action against the
party by a common informer suing qui
tam: 4 Geo. 3, c. 13, s. 4; turmyy.
Smith, 11 East 25. And there seems to
be no question the sheriff is amenable
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for the act of his officers, though the
offence be indictable: Woodgate v.
Knatc bull, 2 T. R. 148.
And we see no objection in point of
principle or precedent, to allowing an
action in favor of the state upon all
actions which sound in damages merely,
and where the object is to recover a
pecuniary mulct or penalty. Thus, in
actions to enforce recognisances in' criminal cases, or in penal actions, there
would be no such uncertainty as would be
likely to embarrass the courts or juries.
It has been often held that the liability
of a sheriff is in the nature of a tort, and
that assumpsit will not lie: Walbridge v.
Griswold, I D. Chip. (Vt.) 162. So also
of a collector of taxes: Charlestowa v.
Stacy, 10 Vt. R. 562. But beyond this it
seems to us the sheriff is so much a part
of the government, being the head of the
police force of the county and of the
posse comitatus, that there would be an
incongruity in quickening his pulses in
favor of duty by an action on the case

for any tortious act or neglect. The
remedy of public opinion and in extreme
cases, where there is reason to presume
bad faith and criminal connivance, by
attachment and imprisonment, in the,
discretion of the court, or by fine, would
seem more natural and effective, in the
majority of cases.
But we are not insensible to the fact
that all punishment, as well as reward,
is fast coming to be measured by its
direct effect upon mutual interests and
pecuniary advantage or loss. It is humiliating to reflect that it is so, so much as
the stubborn facts compel us to recognise.
And when that high sense of honor, that
made the sheriffs of England to be reckoned among the nobility, as vice comes,
or the deputy of the earl, when that fails
to render such important officers insensible to all considerations except the
strict law of duty, it may become necessary to extend pecuniary penalties so as
to embrace all the duties of the sheriff.
L F. R.

Louisville Chancery Court, Kentucky.
HORD AND WIFE v. CRUTCHER AND ALEXANDbER.
Real estate in Kentucky was sold under an execution during the rebellion.
The owners were residents of Mfississippi, a state at war with the United States.
A. having deterred other purchasers by announcing that he was bidding for the
owners, bought the land for half its real value, and afterwards sold and conveyed
it to B. for double the price he had paid, and claimed to hold the proceeds for his
own use : Held that
A. could not be considered a trustee for the owners by parol on account of the
Statute of Frauds, nor by any form of contract, express or implied, because the
owners were then public enemies.
The question whether or not B. had notice of A.Is announcement at the sale was
therefore immaterial, and his title to the land valid.
But the owners might recover from A., as his acts did not constitute a contract
but a tort, as to which the right of action was only suspended by the war.
The measure of damages is the advance A. received on his resale, allowing him
interest on his payineut, and reasonable cOmmissions.

THE opinion of the court was delivered by
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PIRTLE, Chancellor.-The plaintiffs were the owners of a tract
of land in Jefferson county, Kentucky, which had been incumbered by certain liens that had been foreclosed, and a decree of
sale obtained. At the time of the sale, in April 1862, the
defendant Crutcher bid for the land, and announced that he was
bidding for the owners of the land, who were in the state of Mississippi, and, of course, on account of the war, unable to attend
personally to any business in Kentucky; and this announcement
induced persons who intended to bid, to forbear; and the land
was sold for less than its value by reason of this announcement.
The party bidding was not an appointed agent.
In February 1864, the defendant Crutcher sold the land to the
defendant Alexander, for something more than twice as much as
he had bidden for it, and the plaintiffs brought this suit in October 1865, alleging these factsi and that Alexander was aware of
the announcement of Orutcher at the judicial sale. This Alexander denies. I think it may be assumed from the proof, or for
the sake of the argument, that a person who waa an attorney at
law, and who examined the title for and as the friend of Alexander, in his absence, had reasonable notice of the fact; but it is
not shown that Alexander ever ordered the employment of an
attorney to examine the title, or that he desired an examination
to be made by his agent (for he bought by an agent), and the
agent says in his deposition that he did not employ an attorney,
and that he had no notice himself of what occurred at the sale,
and it is not pretended that any notice came to Alexander personally until he had received the deed for the property and had
paid a considerable portion of the purchase-money. Notice to
the attorney at law was no notice to Alexander or his agent; and
notice to an agent of an agent, unless he is also agent for the
principal in fact, or by construction of law, by reason of privity,
is no notice to the principal.
We see it laid down generally in many books, that to be a
purchaser without notice, the party must have paid the whole
purchase-money and received the deed; but this generally is
only, or absolutely, true as to the purchase-money paid after
notice, not as to what is paid before ; for generally, not always,
to that extent the purchaser has the better equity. It depends
much on the relief the purchaser seeks-a lien on the land for
what he paid, or the land itself.
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The plai.tiffs seek to recover the land from Alexander, because
Crutcher held it as trustee for them; and Alexander says in
addition to his want of notice, that they were of the people of the
rebellious states, in actual war against the United States, aiding
and abetting the enemies of the government at the time of the
purchase of Crutcher, and of his purchase from Crutcher, and
that there could be no such thing as the trust of an estate held
for them according to the general laws of war, and the action
taken by the Congress and the President in pursuance thereof.
It appears they were residents of Mississippi at the time.
. This defence I deem conclusive as to Alexander. There could
not strictly be a trust estate in the lands created by oral declarations of Crutcher in favor of any person, and especially not of
persons living in the enemy's country; and the state of Mississippi was then the country of an enemy. I am sorry to write it.
It is undoubtedly true that when a person, by-his declarations
at a public sale of property, induces other persons not to bid,
because he is bidding for an absent or distressed owner, and he
obtains the property for less than its value, by such means, and
afterwards he pretends to hold it as his own, fairly bought; the
courts will say it is not fair to hold it; and sometimes he is
called a trustee; but this is only an artificial expression, made
by the courts, to indicate the remedy to be given as to the thing
so bought. He is a holder by indirection and wrong, unless the
other party treats him with gross inattention of his kindness, if it
were so originally intended, by not coming to. stand in- his place
in proper time, on notice of what he has done.
In this case Crutcher could not be a trustee by parol according
to the Statute of Frauds, and he could not be a trustee by any
other shape of contract, because he could not make a contract in
regard to property in Kentucky with the plaintiffs, who at that
time stood as alien enemies, in Mississippi ; and the law, of course,
from what he did, would have implied no contract of trust with
these parties, as a direct contract could not lawfully have been
made, or any title or estate in-trust created.
Then, as to Alexander, it does not matter whether he had
notice or not.
But, as to Crutcher, how does the. case stand?
He evidently, by his announcement that he was bidding for
absent persons in this distressing time of war, did discourage,
and indeed, stop other bidding, and did obtain the property for
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much less than -it was worth. Now, in this time of war, and
general non-intercourse and common suffering, he could not have
expected that the purchase-money could be repaid to him soon,
or in any definite time ; and it is not shown that the plaintiffs had
any notice of what had been going on. They ought to have come
forward to indemnify him at some reasonable time, under the circumstances, at any rate, or he might have sold the land to.indemnify himself. But in February 1864 it was not reasonable for
him to sell the land at such an advanced price, and put all the
money in his own pocket (although, perhaps, he might have done
so, as far as his own indemnity required), for the plaintiffs could
not have been taken to have rejected the act which seemed a
kindness.
The plaintiffs could not sue upon a contract or any declaration
making him an actual trustee of the land for them; because the
law of war did not allow such contract or declaration to be
binding (nor did the Statute of Frauds), if no outside equitable
circumstances were connected with the parol contract or declaration ; and besides, it was nudum pactum, if it was only a pact ;
but here there was no sort of contract; for the plaintiffs knew
nothing of what had taken place.
But their action is to be sustained upon the wrong done to
them, by pretending to favor them when he brought an injury to'
them. Their action for this was suspended during the war, but
when the war was over, their right to bring the suit, the persona
standi in judicio, came to each of them as if there had been no
war at the time. For the law of nations, in cases of wrongs to
persons, or property, during the war-not in cases of contracts
made during the war, for they are void-only suspends the.
remedy, because an enemy cannot bring an action, while standing
as an enemy, in our courts, but when the war is over the wrong.
doer is subject to the action for the wrong done during the war,
not connected with the war in any way, as in the case of a tort;
for then comes the right to sue, untouched by the war.
Orutcher must, therefore, pay to the plaintiffs what he received
from Alexander over and above what he paid for the land, allowing interest on what he paid io the time when he was reimbursed
by payment from Alexander, and reasonable commission; and
the case is referred to the commissioner to report what this shall
be, taking into consideration rents and improvements. And, as
to Alexander, the case is dismissed.

HUNT v. JACKSON.

Circuit Court of the United States, Southern -Districtof New

York.

In f,quity.

FREDERICK HUNT AND OTHERS v. A. J. JACKSON.
Where there is no conflict with the claims of domestic creditors, the assignees

ot a foreign bankrupt may site in the United States courts for property of their
bankrupt.
DEmurRER to a bill in: equity. The petitioners were citizens
of England, and are assignees in bankruptcy of one Goldring, an
insolvent merchant of London. The resp6ndent was a citizen of
the state of New York, residing in the city of NeW York.
The mateiial allegations of the bill, which were admitted by
the demurrer, are as follows:That the bankrupt, Goldring, before his bankruptcy, carried
on business as a merchant in London, and that on the 21st of
April 1864 he had consigned to the respondent, a merchant in
New York, an invoice of diamonds of the value of 12271. 12s. 6d.
for sale on commissionh, which diamonds duly came into the
respondent's possession at New York.
That on the 8th of August 1864, at London, Goldring was, in
the' Court of Bankruptcy, duly adjudicated a bankrupt, and that
on the 30th day of the same month the petitioners were appointed
creditors' assignees, whereby the bankrupt's estate became vested
in them.
That on the same day one Henry Honey, of London; was, at a
meeting of the creditors, appointed manager to collect and wind
up the es-ate of the bankrupt.
That on the first day of September 1864 Honey wrote to the
respondent, on behalf of these petitioners, requesting him to
remit the proceeds of the diamonds sold, and return those unsold.
That on the 30th of September 1864 the respondent wrote
Honey in reply that all the diamonds remained unsold, and. that
he would return them as Honey might direct on receiving the
amount of his outlay and expenses, amounting, as he said, to
2641. 14s. 4d.
NO account of outlay or expenses was rendered. The petitioners have repeatedly requested an account, but the respondent
has omitted to render it.
On tih'c facts the petitioners asked for an account and disco-
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very of the expenses, and that upon payment to the respondent
of such a sum as might be found to be justly due him for expenses,
&c., on account of the diamonds, he might be ordered to surreinder
them to the petitioners.
The ground of demurrer was, in substance, that the petitioners
as assignees under a foreign bankrupt law, had no legal capacity
to institute and maintain this suit.
A.
. lVanderpoel and -. Blankman, in support of the
demurrer.-I. The facts set forth in the bill of complaint do not
establish any title to the diamonds, or any right to prosecute the
defendant therefor. The complainants have no standing in court.
Their appointment as creditors' assignees did not confer on them
title to goods which at the time were out of the territory or jurisdiction of the court from which they received their appointment:
Harrison v. Sterry, 5 Cranch 289; Booth v. Clark, 17 How.
(U. S.) 322, 337; UTpton v. Hubbard, 28 Conn. 2T4; Cleve v.
Mills, 1 Cook B. L. 243; Waring v. Knight, Id. 307; La
Chevalier v. Lynch, Doug. 170 (A. D. 1779.); Holmes v. Remsen,
20 Johns. 229, overruling s. c., 4 Johns. Chanc. 460; Blake v.
Williams, 6 Pick. 286; Ingraham v. Geyer, 13 Mass. 147;
Abraham v. Plestero, 3 Wend. 538; Johnson v. Hunt, ,23 Id.
87; .lfosselman v. Caen, 34 Barb. 66; Plesterav. Abraham, 1
Paige 236; Am. Law Jour- N. S. 294, cited 6 Barb. 99 n.;
-De Witt v. Burnett, 6 Barb. 89; Hoyt v. Thompson's Bz'r.,
19 N. Y. 207, 224, 225.
11. The course pointed out by Lord KAMES seems to be the
only one which can be adopted to vest the title in the assignees,
and enable them to assert that title: Lord Kames's Prin. of
jEquity (4th ed.) 574.
III. If it is to be regarded merely as a question of legal assertion of title, the plaintiffs cannot sustain this action: Iorrell v.
Dickey, 1 Johns. Chan. R. 153 ; Williams v. Storrs, 6 Id. 353 ;
Campbell v. Tousey, 7 Cow. 68; Robinson v. Crandall,9 Wend.
426; Parsonsv. Zyman, 20 N. YT. 103; Britton v. Valentine,
1 Curtis's Cir. Ct. R. 168, 174; Attorney-General v. Bowers,
4 M. & N. 171 ; Same v: -Dimond,1 C. & Jer. 356 ; Stearns v.
Bernhaus, 5 Greenl. 261 ; Thompson v. Wilson, 2 N. -H. 291 ;
.Newton v. Bronson, 13 N. Y. 587; Booth v. Clark, 17 How.
322, 337 ; Blake v. Williams, 6 Pick. 286, 313, 314.
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IV. The complainants not having title to the subject of the
action, cannot maintain this bill. They have no right to the discovery asked for. They have no right to call in question the
amount of the lien, or to ask this defendant to account to them,
or surrender the property to them.
There is no privity between the complainants and defendant;
his liability is to Goldring-Goldring can come at any time and
demand the property and the account: Abraham v. Plestero, 3
Wend. 538; Story's Eq. Pl. 728.
C . C. Langdell and -. B. Merril, contrA.-I. The respondent presents a case wholly destitute of merit. He is certainly
liable to account to some one, and the complainants are the only
persons in the world who have any right to call him to account.
His object in interposing this demurrer is to avoid accounting to
any one, and thus to enforce the extortionate demand contained
in his letter annexed to the bill of complaint.
H. We admit that the assignment in bankruptcy under which
the complainants claim, has no force yroprio vigore, and that .it
must be indebted for such force as it may have, entirely to the
comity of this state.
This disposes of a large portion of the authorities cited for the
respondent.
III. We also admit that this comity will not be extended so
far as to deprive our own citizens of such remedies as our laws
may afford to recover their debt.
This disposes of nearly all the other authorities cited for the
respondent.
I r. The comity of this state will permit the assignment in
question to have full effect upon the property of the bankrupt
here at the time of the assignment, except so far as it may conflict with the rights of our own citizens. This is the rule declared
in the third maxim of Huberus (Story's Confl. of Laws 929);
sustained by the authority of Story (Ibid., § 938, 420); fully
recognised by the Supreme Court of the United States (13 Peters
589), and established as the law of this state by the conclusive
authority of the Court of Appeals.
The case of Hfoyjt v. Thompson, 1 Seld. 420, is precisely in
point. It was an equity case, like the present; as in the present
case, the defendants demurred to the bill, and the court unani-

HUNT v. JACKSON.

mously overruled the demurrer upon the sole ground, that the
complainants' title, which was under a foreign statutory assignment, was good as against the debtor, and so long as it did not
conflict with the claims of creditors, or bond fide purchasers in
this state: 1 Seld. 356, 357, 338, 344. The case came again
before the court (19 N. Y. 207), when the previous decision was
upheld (pp. 224, 226).
V. The case 1 Selden 420 renders it unnecessary to advert to
the earlier cases in this state, and also shows that the dictum in
iosselman v. Caen, 34 Barb. 66, is not law. The case of Willetts v. Waite, 25 N. Y. 577, is in entire harmony with the
views urged by us. The dictum in Harrisonv. Sterry, 5 Cranch
302, is merely to the effect that a foreign bankrupt law has no
effect here roprfo vigore, which we have admitted: Story's
Confl. of Laws, § 421; 1 Seld. 344, per RuGGLEs, C. J. The
case of Booth v. Clark, 17 How. 326, is not in point. That was
the case of a receiver in equity, and it was expressly distinguished
from the case of a statutory assignee.
VI. The case of foreign executors and administrators is not
analogous to the present. The property of a person deceased is
in custodia legis from the very moment of his death, until it is
duly administered under the law of the state where it is found;
and that is the reason why a foreign executor or administrator
cannot sue in this state ; he must take out letters here.
SHIPMAN, J.-The right of foreign assignees in bankruptcy to
maintain suits in the courts of this country, and the extent of
that right, if any exists, has been repeatedly and elaborately
discussed both by elementary writers and in judicial opinions.
.Great diversity of views has been expressed, and different results
reached in different cases. No advantage would be gained by a
rehearsal of these discussions here. In nearly all the cases where
the rights of the foreign assignees have been contested, there has
been a conflict between their alleged rights and the claims of
other parties, citizens or residents of our own country, or aliens
pursuing remedies in our own courts, against the assets of the
bankrupt. But in the language of lr. Justice STORY, in his
Conflict of Laws, § 420: " I n most of these cases in which assignments under foreign bankrupt laws have been denied to give title
against attaching creditors, it has been distinctly admitted that
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assignees might maintain suits in our courts under such assignments for the property of the bankrupt. This is avowed in the
most unequivocal manner in the leading cases in Pennsylvania
and New York already cited, and it is silently admitted in those
of Massachusetts."
This statement of the law is cited and concurred in by RuGLES, C. J., in Hoyt v. Thompson, 19 N. Y. 207, decided by the
New York Court of Appeals in 1851; and PAIGE, J., in an opinion delivered in the same case, remarks: "Where neither the
rights of domestiQ creditors, or of foreign creditors proceeding
against the property under our laws, are involved, the foreign
assignee may be permitted to sue in our courts, for the benefit of
all the -creditors, on principles of national comity, without a surrender of the principle -that a foreign statutory assignment does
not operate a transfer of property in this state."
The result of the cases-was accurately stated by Mr. Justice
STORY, and citations might be .multiplied from judicial opinions,
which, while they deny the right of the foreign assignee where it
conflicts with the claims of creditors seeking the aid of our own
courts, almost invariably concede his capacity to sue as the
representative of the bankrupt to the same extent which the lattercould have done if no bankruptcy had taken place. This, as
already shown, was evidently the judgment of the New York
Court of Appeals when the case of Hoyt v. Thompson was
decided.
The only doubt which has been raised as to the correctness of
this view of the law, so far as we know, has originated from the
remarks of the judges in the cases of 21Ios8elman v. Caen, 84
Barb. 66, and in Wifletts v. Waite, 25 N. Y. Court of Appeals
377. But the former case was disposed of on other ground.
The latter followed Eoyt v. Thomp8on, and as an authority it
goes no further than that case. (See Judge Au&sN's opinion,

p. 587.)
It is true that the same judge (p. 586), after stating that1"the
rule in the state and in the .United States is, that in cases of
assignment by operation of law, the assignees are in the same
situation as the bankrupt himself in regard to foreign debtsthey take subject to every equity, and subject to the remedies
provided by the law of the foreign country where the debt is due,
and the property is situated," adds: "The reasoning of our
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courts would, dbubtless, carry the rule further, and prohibit
assignees under foreign bankrupt laws from suing in our courts."
The rule has- never been carried to this point by the courts of
N{ew York, in any decision where the precise question was necessarily involved. We certainly shall not lead the way in that
direction, and should hesitate somewhat before we followed.
The demurrer is overruled with costs.

Supreme Court of .Ilinois.
TAYLOR v. THOMPSON ET AL.
Where the constitution provides that the corporate authorities of counties, townships, school-districts, cities, towns, and villages, may be vested with power to
assess and collect taxes for corporate purposes, such taxes to be uniform in regard
to persons and property within the jurisdiction of the body imposing the same, and
that the specification of the objects and subjects of taxation shall not deprive the
General Assembly of power to require other objects and subjects to be taxed in
such manner as may be consistent with the principles of taxation fixed in the constitution, an Act of the General Assembly authorizing the towns in certain counties
therein named to levy a tax to pay bounties to persons who should thereafter enlist
or be drafted into the army of the United States, a vote of the people of such towns
having been first taken, is not unconstitutional.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
LAWRENCE, J.-On the 5th of February 1865 the legislature
passed a law (page. 102, Probate Laws of 1865), authorizing the
towns in certain counties therein named, to levy a tax to pay
bounties to persons who should thereafter enlist or be drafted
into the. army of the United States, a vote of the people of the
township being first taken. The people of the township of Odell,
in the county of Livingston, voted a tax under this law, and the
appellant, alleging that he was a non-resident of the township,
but owning property there, filed a bill to enjoin the township
officers from its collection. The tax is resisted on the ground
that it was unconstitutional.
The fifth and sixth sections of article 9 of the constitution are
as follows
"5. The corporate authorities of counties, townships, scho6ldistricts, cities, towns, and villages, may be vested with power to
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assess and collect taxes for corporate purposes, such taxes to be
uniform in regard to persons and property within the jurisdiction
of the body imposing the same; and the General Assembly shall
require that all property within the limits of municipal corporations, belonging to individuals, shall be taxed.for the payment of'
debts contracted under the authority of law.
" 6. The specifications of the objects and subjects of taxation
shall not deprive the General Assembly of the power to require
other objects or subjects to be taxed in such manner as may be
consistent with the principles of taxation fixed in th~e constitution."
See article 9, sections 5 and 6.
. It is urged that the tax in question is not a tax for " corporate
purposes," within the meaning of the foregoing provision.
While there are some objects of taxation so marked and distinctive that no person would feel any difficulty in determining
whether they did or did -not fall under the head of "corporate
purposes," there are many so uncertain in their character that
the most intelligent and candid minds would differ in regard to
them. When, therefore, the legislature has authorized the levy
of certain taxes, and has thereby declared them to be, in its opinion, taxes for "corporate purposes," we should not hold such
taxes to be unconstitutional, merely because their corporate character admits of some debate. A proper respect for the legislative department of the government requires us to regard its acts
as primd facie constitutional, and when the question turns upon
the precise meaning of a phrase of ambiguous import, we must
needs hesitate long before we pronounce an act of the legislature
void.
Again, the words "1corporate purposes," as.used in the constitution, should not receive a narrow or rigid construction. The
framers of that instrument must have designed to leave a large
discretion to the legislature, as to what should be considered as
falling within that phrase. Under democratic forms of government, the object of those clauses in a written constitution which
restrict the power of the legislature, is to preserve a minority
from injustice at the hands of a majority. Under the constitution
of Illinois, this object is attained, so far as relates to taxation,
by the provision in the second section of the ninth article, requiring taxation to be by valuation, so that every person and
corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his or its
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property. This-provision, so long as it is observed, f> -u"
equality of taxation between all classes and individuals, a
thereby protects every class from oppression by any other. T!
legislature will necessarily be composed, in a very large degre
of persons who are not only property-holders themselves, but the
representatives of property-holders, and as every tax imposed or
authorized must bear equally upon all property within the .district
where it is to be levied, and by whose votes it is to be raised, the
sharp dictates of self-interest may be safely relied upon as a security against oppressive or unjust taxation. That the framers of
the constitution deemed they had furnished all the safeguards
necessary on this behalf, when they provided for absolute equality
of taxation, and that they thought it unwise to hamper the legislature with any restrictions as to either the subjects or the purposes of taxation, is evident from the sixth section of the ninth
article above quoted. That section provides that the specification
of the objects and subjects of taxation shall not deprive the legislature of the power to require other objects or subjects to be
taxed. We do not quote this as showing that the legislature may
authorize a municipality to impose taxes for other than "1corporate purposes," but as illustrating the fact that the framers of the
constitution thought proper to rely upon the great principle of
absolute equality of taxation as a guarantee against its abuse,
rather than upon a minute specification of its subjects and aims.
And who will deny that this was a wise abstinence on their part,
when we take into view the ever-varying emergencies of society,
and the rapid developments and unforeseen needs of our modern
civilization ?
We have made these general remarks for the purpose of showing that.wheu the constitution authorized the legislature to empower municipalities to impose taxes for corporate -purposes, with
the additional provision that such taxes should be "uniform in
respect to persons and property within the jurisdiction of the
body imposing the same," it has not designed that the phrase
"corporate purposes" should receive so narrow a construction as
to justify the courts in holding that a municipality should not tax
itself, although authorized by an act of the legislature, beca -:.
it might be a debateable question whether the proposed tax wc
promote the 'corporate welfare or not. That a tax may be
plainly beyond this limit as to, call for the interposition of
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courts, we do not deny. "What we tnsist upon is, that unless the
case is exceedingly clear, we should not interfere to annul a selfimposed tax possessing the constitutional quality of uniformity in
respect to persons and property.
We proceed to consider the question whether a tax imposed for
the purpose of raising bounties to secure volunteers in the late
war can be properly called a tax for "corporate purposes." We
may define this phrase to mean a tax to be expended in a manner
which shall promote the general prosperity and welfare of the
municipality which levies it. That every individual tax-payer
shall have a direct interest in the object for which every tax is
laid, or be directly benefited by its expenditure, is unattainable
in the very nature of things. General results are all that can be
expected, and if it appear that a tax has been voted and levied
with an honest purpose to promote the general well-being of the
municipality, and was not designed merely for the benefit of individuals or of a class, its collection should not be stayed by the
courts. In a community, for example, composed of the various
religious sects, it could hardly be contended that a tax levied
upon all to build a church, or support a clergyman for the benefit
of a particular denomination, was a tax for a corporate purpose.
So too, if a tax were levied in order that its proceeds might be
paid over, as a gratuity, to some individual who enjoyed for the
time being the favor of the multitude, there would be no pretence
for calling it'a tax for corporate or municipal purposes. But on
the other hand, a very considerable portion of the taxes in every
municipality are of such character as not directly to benefit nonresident tax-payers, nor indeed every resident. Thus, the creation
of a police force, the establishment of a reform school for juvenile
offenders, of a hospital for persons ill with contagious disease,
would not directly benefit a non-resident taxed for their support,
and yet no person would deny that these are proper ends of
municipal taxation, and justly included in the words "corporate
purposes." They are so, because, while individuals are benefited
by the expenditure of such taxes, yet their purpose and object
are the security of the public against public evils, and the promotion of the corporate welfare.
Where, as in the case before us, the solution of a question
turns upon the meaning of a phrase, we must ascertain in what
sense it has been used in analogous cases. We reason from conVOL. XV.-12
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ceded truths, and we may take the foregoing illustrations as
admitted instances of taxation for corporate purposes. They are
established by fixed and uncontroverted usages. The tax sought
to be enjoined in the case before us is noble in its character,
because the result of new emergencies, but can it be fairly said
to be any less a tax fnr a corporate purpose, than taxes for the
objects above named ? Would the opening of a road, the-laying
out of a public square, the purchase of a fire-engine, the creation
of an almshouse, be as important to the general interests of a
community, as was exemption from the necessary but dreaded
conscription during the last years of the late war ? Doubtless in
all communities there were tax-payers who would not be personally liable to the draft, but who was there in any community, so
isolated as not to be liable, to be stricken by it through his
kindred or friends, or injured in his pecuniary interests through
the complex relations which men bear to each other in society ?
The teachers who educate our children, the clergy who administer
the consolations of our holy religion to the sick and dying, the
magistrates who guard our laws, the mechanics who carry on our
industries, the farmers who supply our food, were equally liable
to be swept from the various communities which were thriving
upon their labors. And can it be truthfully said that the sudden
tearing away of whola classes of such men, was not an injury to
the entire community, and that a tax by which it could be avoided
was not a tax for a "corporate purpose" ? But besides all this,
many of these men would leave behind them families that had
derived their support from the daily toil of the husband or the
father, and these families, in his absence, would fall upon the
community for support.
. These evils were not wholly avoided by furnishing volunteers,
but they were immeasurably lessened. -For the volunteers were
largely made up of the youth of the country-promising and gallant it is true, and consecrating for ever the battle-fields where
so many of them laid down their lives-but still so young that a
large part of them had not become the heads of families, or settled
as a permanent element in society. The departure, therefore,
of fifty or a Liandred volunteerk from a small community, inflicted
upon its general well-being and prosperity a far less violent shock
than would have been caused by the loss of the same number bf
persons torn away by the indiscriminate chances of the draft, and
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in view of this fact, a tax levied for the purpose of saving a community from the evils inseparable from a draft, may be fairly
considered a tax for the common good.
There is another consideration which lends a potent support to,
the validity of this tax. Under the system of drafting adopted
by the Federal Government, each city and township in the state
was assessed for its respective quota of men. It was determined
what amount of military service was due to the government from
each municipal community, under the Acts of Congress, to which
all owed obedience. The rendition of this service was a burden
resting on the entire community, and no more due from one individual member of it than from another. True, the service could
only be exacted from persons within certain ages, but the exemption was granted, not because the service was not morally due
from all alike, but because, under and over certain ages, the law
presumed a physical disability to render it.
The service being thus due from the entire population of a
town, and, as citizens of a common country, due from all the'constituents of the population alike, the legislature authorizes the
town to relieve itself from the burden, if it can do so, by hiring
competent men voluntarily to perform the required service.
By the chances of the draft this burden might fall on the
shoulders of ten men out of every hundred, and yet morally it
would no more belong to any one of the ten who might be taken,
than to any one of the ninety who might be left. Even legally,
it would devolve on them only because blind chance so determined. Now if this birden, properly resting on the whole
community, could be changed into the form of voluntary service,
and thus rendered not only vastly less onerous to the entire community, but be equally distributed among them in the form of a
pecuniary tax, can there be really any question that such a tax
would be a tax for a "corporate purpose"? The service was
assessed against a town as a corporate community, and as such
community it renders the service by the aid of a corporate tax.
The tax is levied, not for the benefit of the volunteers who receive
its proceeds, but for that of the community to whom it brings
relief.
We hold the acts of the legislature authorizing the levy of these
taxes to be constitutional.
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We must not, however, be understood as expressing any opinion as to that portion of the law which authorizes the payment
of a bounty to men already drafted. That there is a difference
between bounties to drafted men and bounties to volunteers is
obvious, and whether the former are sustainable is a question
which we will not decide until called upon to do so by the record.
The case before us does not present that point. It was heard on
demurrer to the bill, and the demurrer was sustained. The bill
nowhere alleges that any portion of the taxes sought to be
enjoined, were levied for the purpose of paying bounties to
drafted men. The averment is simply that the taxes are levied
"for the purposes recited in the act aforesaid." lyon coastat
but that they may have been all levied for bounties to volunteers.
Or, if it be said that the averment is in substance that they were
partly levied for volunteers and partly for drafted men, then,
even if it should be held that the last-named purpose was unlawful, the demurrer must still be sustained.
If a judgment for taxes is brought to this court, and it appears
that it has been rendered for taxes, a part of which are illegal.
the judgment will be reversed, as in the case of Campbell v. The
S tate, decided at the present term, because the judgment is a
unit. But when a,bill in chancery is filed, to enjoin the collection of taxes, on the ground that they are in part illegal, the bill
must show to what extent they are so, in order that the court
may enjoin only the illegal portion, or else must show they are
so levied that it is impossible to discriminate between the legal
and illegal portion. There are no such allegations in this bill.
We remark, in conclusion, that taxation for a similar purpose
has been held valid by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in
the case of iS'peer v. Schot Directorsof Blairsville, reported in
4 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 661, and in the Supreme Court of Connecticut, in Booth v. The Town of Woodbury, 5 Id. 202.
Decree affirmed.

